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DISPARATE IMPACT DISCRIMINATION:
THE LIMITS OF LITIGATION, THE
POSSIBILITIES FOR INTERNAL COMPLIANCE
MELISSA HART*
INTRODUCTION
Since the theory was first proposed by a group of creative litigators and adopted
by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,' disparate impact has been a
flashpoint for the hopes and the anxieties of those struggling with the goal of equal
employment opportunity. From the earliest days of the operation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 it was evident that an antidiscrimination mandate
would only be effective if plaintiffs were able to challenge not only blatantly racist
or sexist conduct but also practices and policies that may be neutral in appearance
but whose effects are anything but neutral. Disparate impact enables challenges to
policies that, while facially neutral, place a disproportionate burden on members of
a protected class, and thus the theory seemed to carry the potential for removing
the "built-in headwinds" that blocked progress for minorities and women. 3 The
hope was that "the disparate impact theory would reach discrimination that was
otherwise out of reach for claims of intentional discrimination."'4
It remains a matter of considerable debate whether disparate impact has lived up
to the aspirations of those who conceived it. And even among those who laud its
early successes, there are many who question its potential as a litigation tool for
the future. The available evidence suggests that these skeptics are correct that
disparate impact litigation is unlikely to play a vital role in the future of
employment discrimination litigation. Furthermore, the bifurcation of
antidiscrimination law into two discrete theories-one addressed to intentional
discrimination and one addressed to neutral policies with discriminatory effects-
has had negative consequences for employment discrimination litigation. But the
limits of litigation, however frustrating for potential plaintiffs, should not be seen
* Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School. This essay grew out of a talk
presented at the 2007 National Conference on Law and Higher Education. I would like to thank
Robert Belton, Nestor Davidson, Jonathan Fineman, Sarah Krakoff, Martin Katz and Pierre
Schlag for their helpful feedback on the ideas expressed here.
1. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to e-15 (2000).
3. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
4. Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701,
702 (2006).
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as identical with the limits of the law. While litigation is essential for enforcement
of legal mandates, voluntary compliance is similarly important. Disparate impact
theory significantly changed the contours of compliance and its conceptual
framework continues to influence "best practices" for the many employers who are
themselves trying to further Title VII's goal---"[t]he elimination of discrimination
in the workplace." '5
One setting where both the limits of litigation and the potential for internal
compliance are particularly apparent is the academic workplace. On the one hand,
courts have taken an especially deferential approach to faculty hiring and
promotion decisions, such that successful litigation challenges to tenure and other
employment decisions are rare. At the same time, the interest in compliance in the
university setting, together with the relatively strong worker voice in academic
employment, create potential for regular examination and innovation in approaches
to compliance with antidiscrimination goals.
This essay will consider the current state of the disparate impact theory from
each of these angles. First, I will examine the limitations of disparate impact
theory as a litigation tool. Second, I will consider how these limitations are part of
a larger problem in the way employment discrimination litigation has been framed
by the courts. Third, I will discuss the positive impact that disparate impact has
had on compliance efforts and the significance of compliance as a tool in efforts to
eliminate workplace discrimination. Here, I will focus particularly, though not
exclusively, on the university setting. A number of scholars have concluded that
success in furthering equality in campus employment is most likely to come
through internal change. Thus, compliance options take on particular significance
in the academic arena.
THE LIMITATIONS OF DISPARATE IMPACT
Griggs has been heralded as one of the most important civil rights cases in
United States legal history.6 In one of its first cases to interpret Title VII, the
Supreme Court in Griggs accepted the idea that a facially neutral policy could
violate federal law if its effects were discriminatory and the employer could not
articulate a business necessity for the policy.7 The case involved a challenge to the
Duke Power Company's requirements that all employees in certain previously
segregated lines of employment have the equivalent of a high school diploma and a
satisfactory test result on a professionally prepared aptitude test.8 The Court did
not consider the evidence of intentional discriminatory treatment sufficient in the
case as presented, but it concluded that "tests neutral on their face, and even
5. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995) (quoting Oscar
Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979)).
6. See, eg., Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty: A Brief Look at the Birth, Death, and
Resurrection of the Disparate Impact Theory of Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
431, 433 (2005); Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Legacy of Griggs: Social Progress and Subjective
Judgments, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1987).
7. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436.
8. Id. at 427-28.
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neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status
quo of prior discriminatory employment practices." 9
While the Court's articulation of it new standard seemed to embrace an
expansive view of discrimination and a commitment to its elimination, disparate
impact has never really lived up to its potential. In theory, it still could. Indeed,
less than two years ago, the Supreme Court concluded that disparate impact claims
were viable under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,' 0 and thus certainly
affirmed the viability of the theory more generally. But despite this recent
affirmation, it is fair to say that disparate impact litigation is struggling for life.
Part of this struggle is simply a result of the very low success rate plaintiffs
have in disparate impact challenges. In his recent article on disparate impact,
Michael Selmi presented the results of an empirical analysis of lower courts'
handling of disparate impact cases that shows that plaintiffs have fared very poorly
with these claims." In the district courts, plaintiffs are successful in about 25
percent of disparate impact cases; in the courts of appeals, plaintiffs fare even
worse, winning about 19 percent of the time on their disparate impact arguments.12
Moreover, among those cases, one third of appellate victories for plaintiffs and one
half of the district court victories also presented successful disparate treatment
claims involving intentional discrimination, raising a serious question about the
significance of the disparate impact claim to the outcome of the litigation.' 3
The reasons for these numbers are varied. Defendant employers have become
more sophisticated in the kinds of workplace tests they adopt, so most tests that
might cause some impact can nonetheless survive a challenge because they can be
justified by business necessity. 14 While employers in the early days of Title VII
might not have analyzed how their job requirements were tied to measuring job
performance, employers are now aware that employment tests must be validated as
job related and justifiable as consistent with business necessity.' 5 Selmi's study
also concludes that courts are less likely to find a disparate impact at all than they
were in the immediate aftermath of Title VII's enactment. 16 And independent of
these fairly low statistical success rates, disparate impact claims have simply never
made much headway beyond the context of the theory's initial conception-the
written tests at issue in Griggs and other early objective standards.' 7
More generally, the history of disparate impact law reflects a deep judicial and
9. Id. at 430.
10. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
11. Selmi, supra note 4, at 738-43.
12. Id. at 738-40. This is lower than the plaintiff success rate of about 35 percent in
employment discrimination cases more generally. Id. at 739-40.
13. Id. at 740-41.
14. Id. at 741.
15. See Elaine W. Shoben, Disparate Impact Theory in Employment Discrimination:
What's Griggs Still Good For? What Not?, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 597, 598-99 (2004). The fact that
employers do this more careful evaluation is unquestionably one of the successes of Griggs. But
it also creates limitations on the theory's future significance.
16. Selmi, supra note 4, at 741.
17. Id. at 749-53.
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public ambivalence about the theory. Even those moments of victory in the history
of disparate impact law have lacked the glory of true wins. For example, though
many scholars and advocates looked hopefully to the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as a
revitalizing moment for the theory, its reality was very mixed. The 1991 law was
passed in response to a series of 1989 Supreme Court interpretations of federal
antidiscrimination laws. 18 Among those Supreme Court cases, one of the most
criticized was Wards Cove Packing Company v. Atonio, 19 which was viewed by
many as drastically redefining-or even, as Robert Belton has put it,
"dismantling"-disparate impact. 20  Wards Cove held that a disparate impact
plaintiff had to identify specifically which employer practice was causing the
complained of effects, that the plaintiff, rather than the defendant, carried the
ultimate burden of demonstrating that the practice was not a business necessity,
and that any proposed alternative practice had to be equally as effective and no
more costly. 21 In the wake of this decision, there was a widespread call for a
legislative fix to the Court's narrowing redefinition of standards for litigating
disparate impact claims.
The legislature did indeed respond to Wards Cove with legislation, but its
response was hardly a radical one. In the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Congress largely
retained the first of the Court's requirements, obliging disparate impact plaintiffs in
most instances to identify the challenged practices specifically. 22 The new law
included a rarely applicable exception for circumstances where plaintiffs can show
that employer practices cannot be separated for purposes of analyzing their
impact.23 The legislature did reverse the Court and return the burden of proving
business necessity to the employer. 24 As to the standard for showing a less
discriminatory alternative practice, Congress stated that the standard would be
what it had been the day before Wards Cove was handed down. 25 Since there had
been uncertainty in the courts as to the appropriate standard for a less
discriminatory alternative prior to Wards Cove, this legislative action effectively
reinstated the previous uncertainty. Further, the 1991 Act made clear that a
plaintiff can succeed in disparate impact litigation only if she shows not simply
that a less discriminatory alternative practice exists, but also that the employer
"refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice. '26
So, while the 1991 Civil Rights Act was heralded as a victory for disparate
impact plaintiffs, 27 the changes Congress made have had limited effect.
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (2000) (Purposes of 1991 Amendment) (listing as a purpose
of the Act "to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of
relevant civil fights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination").
19. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
20. Belton, supra note 6, at 463-64.
21. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657-6 1.
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(B)(i) (2000).
23. Id.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (2000).
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(ii), (k)(l)(C) (2000).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(ii) (2000).
27. See, e.g., Belton, supra note 6, at 467-68.
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Defendants retain the burden of showing business necessity, but this has not
proven to be a difficult burden to meet. The exception to the requirement that a
challenged practice be identified specifically has been applied extremely rarely.
And the "less discriminatory alternative practice" standard is basically
insurmountable. In the years since 1991, plaintiffs have been less successful in
disparate impact claims than they were in years preceding the law's enactment. 28
Moreover, another provision of that Act-the addition of compensatory and
punitive damages potential exclusively for claims of intentional discrimination-
has made disparate impact a less attractive option for plaintiffs. 29
The Supreme Court's decision in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust3° offers
another example of a legal event that could have been a victory for disparate
impact plaintiffs, but that ultimately offered little to celebrate. In Watson, the
Court held that disparate impact analysis could be applied to subjective hiring
practices as well as to objective practices like the written tests at issue in Griggs.3 1
At the same time, however, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's plurality opinion
suggested that a plaintiffs burden to prove disparate impact claims should be
significant, while a defendant should have the legal tools to fairly easily defend
against these claims. 32 Thus, the Supreme Court began in Watson the limitation of
the disparate impact theory that would lead to the decision in Wards Cove.
Moreover, very few cases have successfully challenged subjective practices on the
disparate impact theory in the lower courts. Indeed, despite Watson, courts have
generally been extremely resistant to recognizing the application of subjective
judgment as a "neutral" employer policy.33 For the moment at least, as a practical
matter, disparate impact remains primarily applicable to objective tests, and only
successful in those very rare cases in which an employer uses an objective test for
which it cannot come up with a "business necessity" justification.
THE PROBLEM WITH CREATING CATEGORIES OF DISCRIMINATION
Proving discrimination is not always, or even often, an easy task. An
extraordinary amount of time and energy has been devoted to the development of
proof structures for Title VII litigation, and the consequence has often been more
rather than less confusion. Regrettably these complications in proof structures
have bled across into the substantive definitions of discrimination. As Charles
Sullivan has cogently put it, "[o]ne of the antidiscrimination project's pervasive
problems has been the continuing conflation of two separate tasks, that is, defining
discrimination and proving its existence. '34
28. See Selmi, supra note 4, at 738-40.
29. See, e.g., Shoben, supra note 15, at 598.
30. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
31. Id. at991.
32. Id. at 993-99.
33. See Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56
ALA. L. REv. 741, 783-84 (2005).
34. Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47
WM. & MARY L. REv. 911,913 (2005).
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This error has been most evident in the context of disparate treatment law,
where debate continues about the difference between "single-motive" and "mixed-
motive" cases and the appropriateness of employing different statutory and
judicially created proof structures in particular contexts. 35 But the divide between
disparate treatment and disparate impact law is another area in which concerns
about how to prove the existence of discrimination have led to substantive
developments that undercut the effectiveness of the law. The notion that employer
policies and practices must be either intentional, and thus subject to disparate
treatment analysis, or neutral, and thus subject to disparate impact analysis, reflects
a flawed understanding of the way the world actually operates. More seriously, it
risks placing a great deal of workplace conduct and policy outside the reach of
antidiscrimination law.
When I teach Griggs to my employment discrimination class, it never takes
more than a few minutes for a student to raise her or his hand and say, "Doesn't it
seem like what was actually going on here was intentional discrimination?" That
instinct seems to me to be correct, and it is an instinct shared by many. As one
court has expressed it, "[i]n essence, disparate impact theory is a doctrinal
surrogate for eliminating unprovable acts of intentional discrimination hidden
behind facially-neutral policies or practices. ' 36 And even the Supreme Court, in
famously declining to extend the disparate impact theory to challenges under the
Equal Protection Clause, observed that "[n]ecessarily, an invidious discriminatory
purpose may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the
fact, if it is true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than another. '37
In fact, in many disparate impact cases, the notion that the policy at issue is
"neutral" is simply disingenuous. Certainly this was the case in early disparate
impact litigation like Griggs. When employers faced with Title VII held on to
seniority systems that preserved previously explicitly segregated lines of
employment, 38 or applied testing standards unrelated to the jobs at issue but certain
to make upward mobility impossible for African-Americans educated in second-
class schools, 3 9 these decisions were discriminatory. The notion that the same
supervisors who were intentionally discriminating in 1964 simply stopped doing so
on the effective date of Title VII is contrary to anything sociologists and
psychologists have taught about human behavior.
These cases may initially seem easy to cabin as representing the "present effects
of past discrimination" that were common in the early days of Title VII. 40 But
even years later, when the Supreme Court considered the arrangements of Alaskan
fisheries in Wards Cove, the stark segregation of sleeping, eating and working
35. See Hart, supra note 33, at 758-66.
36. EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1274 (1 1th Cir. 2000).
37. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
38. See, e.g., Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 982-83 (5th
Cir. 1969).
39. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427-28 (1971).
40. See, e.g., Belton, supra note 6, at 443-45 (discussing the relationship between the
development of disparate impact theory and the notion of "present effects of past
discrimination").
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arrangements-which Justice Stevens, dissenting in that case, accurately described
as disturbingly like that of the plantation economy 4'-suggested something much
different from "neutral" policies that simply happened to have racial effects.
Moreover, many of the "neutral" policies that almost certainly have a negative
effect on opportunities for women and minorities-policies like word-of-mouth
hiring, nepotism, cronyism or any other employment practice that avoids public
posting or advertising for positions-will consistently reinforce the existing
representation in a workforce. The effects are easy to see, and employers are
certainly aware of them. At what point does the use of these practices cease to be
"neutral" and instead become intentional discrimination?
The difficulties with separating disparate impact from disparate treatment are
perhaps most famously exemplified in the strange history of EEOC v. Joe's Stone
Crab, Inc., an Eleventh Circuit case that was seen as a disparate impact case by the
district court, but reversed on those grounds and remanded for consideration as a
disparate treatment case by the court of appeals. 42 Joe's Stone Crab is a Miami
Beach restaurant that had a long history of hiring almost exclusively male food
servers.4 3 The restaurant hired its new food servers annually through a "roll call"
that included both an application and an interview process." Almost no female
food servers appeared at the annual roll call, and local food service employees
testified that the restaurant had a well-known reputation for hiring only men as
servers.45 The restaurant's maitre d' was responsible for hiring servers, and the
maitre d' responsible for hiring during most of the years involved in the litigation
explained that he relied on his "gut feeling," taking account of applicants'
appearance, articulation, attitude and experience. 46 The company had no written or
verbal hiring policy, and the decisions of the maitre d' were not reviewed by
anyone else in the company. There was no formal restaurant policy mandating the
hiring of male servers, but testimony suggested a general acceptance of this result
and the district court summarized the evidence as demonstrating that Joe's "sought
to emulate Old World traditions by creating an ambience in which tuxedo-clad
men served its distinctive menu."'47
Reviewing this evidence, the district court found that it was insufficient to make
out a disparate treatment claim, but that on these facts the EEOC could challenge
Joe's facially neutral policy of "undirected and undisciplined delegation of hiring
authority to subordinate staff."'48 The Eleventh Circuit took an entirely different
view. The appellate court saw no causal link between a facially neutral policy and
the disparately low numbers of women in the ranks of food servers. Instead, the
court opined that the factual findings "suggest that Joe's hiring system was not in
41. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 663 n.4 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42. See EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1274 (11th Cir. 2000); EEOC v.
Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 969 F. Supp.727 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
43. Joe's Stone Crab, 969 F. Supp. at 731-33.




48. Id. at 738.
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practice facially-neutral, but rather was facially-discriminatory on the basis of
gender."'49 The divergent views of these two courts reviewing the same factual
record reflect the significant overlap between disparate impact and disparate
treatment in employment discrimination law.
In fact, the proof structure in a disparate impact case itself demonstrates the
difficulty of separating this theory from intentional discrimination. In an impact
case, a plaintiff first identifies a policy that has a disproportionate negative impact
on a protected class of employees. 50 The defendant must then demonstrate that the
test is job related and consistent with business necessity. 51 If the defendant makes
that showing, the plaintiff may still prevail if he can identify an alternative practice
that is as effective for the employer's business needs but would have a less
discriminatory impact on the protected class and if the employer refuses to adopt
that alternative practice. 52 For a plaintiff to prevail then, the court must conclude
either that the defendant had no business justification for the practice or that the
same business need could have been met with a less discriminatory alternative
practice. If an employer maintains a policy under either of these circumstances,
the neutrality of that policy is at best suspect.
And yet, despite the blurred line between policies that are "neutral" and those
that are not, courts maintain the legal separation with little or no flexibility. Only a
few years ago, the Supreme Court reversed a lower court finding of discrimination
on the grounds that the court of appeals had impermissibly applied disparate
impact standards in a disparate treatment case. 53 Given this continued dichotomy,
it seems entirely possible that some kinds of employer practices will fall between
these doctrinal cracks and will, despite their disparate impact on protected classes
of workers, escape legal challenge. Thus, for example, in a number of cases
challenging an employer's reliance on excessive, unguided subjectivity in
decisionmaking, courts have been unwilling to view the practice as either neutral
or intentionally discriminatory and have rejected challenges as inappropriate under
either theory.54 Similarly, word-of-mouth hiring policies have struck some courts
as facially neutral, others as intentionally discriminatory, and still others as
impossible to categorize. 55 These are precisely the kinds of employer practices
49. Joe's Stone Crab, 220 F.3d at 1282.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
51. Id.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(K)(l)(A)(ii) (2000).
53. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 55 (2003).
54. See Hart, supra note 33, at 778-88 (discussing judicial response to subjective
decisionmaking claims).
55. See, e.g., EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292, 305 (7th Cir. 1991)
(reversing a district court finding of disparate impact discrimination with the conclusion that
word of mouth hiring was passive conduct by the employer and thus did not constitute a
"practice" that could be challenged under federal law as either disparate impact or disparate
treatment); EEOC v. Consolidated Serv. Sys., 989 F.2d 233, 238 (7th Cir. 1993) (affirming a
district court finding that use of a word-of-mouth policy was not intentional discrimination);
Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 727 F.2d 1429, 1435-36 (9th Cir. 1984) (affirming a district
court application of disparate impact theory, but noting that on the particular facts disparate
treatment might have been the more appropriate theory); NAACP v. City of Evergreen, 693 F.2d
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that are most likely to freeze existing patterns of representation in the workforce
and to block meaningful access for women and minority candidates. To the extent
that current legal doctrine allows these and similar practices to escape challenge, it
presents a limit to the utility of litigation as a tool for change.
THE CONTINUING IMPORTANCE OF IMPACT IN COMPLIANCE EFFORTS
In light of these limitations to disparate impact litigation, there may be some
significant value to shifting the focus of the discussion from litigation strategy to
strategies and goals for compliance. Of course, litigation is absolutely essential
because discrimination is prevalent and destructive and litigation should provide
remedies for acts of discrimination that do occur. Litigation also provides the best
incentive to employers to take action to avoid future discrimination, and many
employers are working hard not to discriminate. So determining what the
governing litigation standards mean for compliance obligations and opportunities
is essential. What do the available theories under Title VII tell us about the
purpose of this antidiscrimination law and the obligations it imposes? After all, the
remedial aspects of the statute are intended to spur employers "to self-examine and
to self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as
possible, the last vestiges" of discrimination.5 6
This focus on compliance is part of a larger scholarly trend that acknowledges
the role that well-intentioned employers, among others, must play in giving true
meaning and life to civil rights laws.57 As Susan Sturm, whose work has been
central in turning attention to the role that non-litigation enforcement mechanisms
play in achieving workplace equality, recently wrote, "[t]hose on the front line
must figure out how to achieve inclusive institutions when the problems causing
racial and gender under-participation are structural, and they must do this under
conditions of considerable legal ambiguity." 58 With a growing recognition that
litigation must be only one part of a broader agenda for changing workplace
dynamics, many scholars and advocates are turning their eye to internal
mechanisms for accountability and change.
The scholarship that has focused attention on employment in higher
education-and in particular on the presence of women and minorities in the
faculty ranks-has generally concluded that in this field, as much if not more than
in others, the best chance for real change will likely come from within. As Martha
1367, 1369 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (reviewing a district court's class certification decision in a case
asserting disparate treatment discrimination in part based on a word-of-mouth hiring policy). See
also Matthew Noll, Comment, Can there be Harmony?: Word of Mouth Hiring Practices after
September 11, 2001, 4 Hous. Bus. & TAX L.J. 151, 166-71 (2004) (discussing word of mouth
cases in several circuits).
56. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975); Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976).
57. See, e.g., Rachel Amow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process: Toward an
Incentivized Organizational Justice Model of Equal Employment Quality for Caregivers, 2006
UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming); Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace
Equity in Higher Education, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247, 249 (2006).
58. Sturm, supra note 35, at 249.
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West, who has done some of the most detailed and sustained research into
representation of women in the academy, said over a decade ago, "[t]o make real
progress against discrimination, we must pursue change within the universities
themselves." 59  Courts have taken such an extremely deferential approach to
academic hiring decisions that litigation often seems unlikely to force reforms in
areas where they are needed. 60 There is, however, some evidence that internal
compliance mechanisms can lead to substantive reform and a more inclusive
academic workplace.
It may be in this context that Griggs and the disparate impact theory will
ultimately be recognized as most important. In the wake of Griggs, many
employers either chose or were forced to eliminate testing that was unrelated to job
performance. Perhaps even more significantly, as both critics and proponents have
recognized, the disparate impact theory opened the door for affirmative action
policies. 61 Disparate impact theory "recognizes the role that institutional choices,
even those that are neutral in design and in application, can play in perpetuating
stratification in the workplace. '62 By focusing attention on the discriminatory
effect that institutional structures can have, and shifting the focus from individual
animus, impact theory opens the door for structural change.
The best hope for employment equality lies in this kind of structural change and
the institutional commitment it requires. The kinds of compliance mechanisms
most likely to foster a more inclusive workplace are, in many instances, focused on
identifying and altering some of the very policies that disparate impact litigation
could in theory target. For example, experts recommend that employers carefully
examine their recruitment procedures to prevent screening women and minority
candidates out of the applicant pool;63 require written performance evaluations
with specific examples to minimize the operation of stereotyping;64 and advertise
or post all positions and promotions, instead of relying on tap-on-the-shoulder or
other informal mechanisms. 65 Each of these recommendations targets a policy or
practice that, while appearing neutral, in fact operates as a "built-in headwind" to
progress for women and minorities in the workplace.
59. Martha S. West, Gender Bias in Academic Robes: The Law's Failure to Protect
Women Faculty, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 68, 70 (1994).
60. See, e.g., Scott A. Moss, Against "Academic Deference ": How Recent Developments in
Employment Discrimination Law Undercut an Already Dubious Doctrine, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 1, 2 (2006).
61. See, e.g., Belton, supra note 5, at 469; Blumrosen, supra note 5, at 4-7; Richard A.
Epstein, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS
234-36 (1992).
62. Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural
Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 137 (2003).
63. See West, supra note 59, at 157.
64. See JOCELYN LARKIN & CHRISTINE E. WEBBER, AM. BAR ASSOC., CHALLENGING
SUBJECTIVE CRITERIA IN EMPLOYMENT CLASS ACTIONS (2005), available at
http://www.impactfund.org/pdfs/Subjective%2oCriteria.pdf.
65. See William T. Bielby, Can I Get a Witness?: Challenges of Using Expert Testimony
on Cognitive Bias in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 7 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J.
377 (2003).
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In addition to monitoring these kinds of practices, employer efforts to ensure
employment equality can and should include systemic reform efforts. As the
federal Glass Ceiling Commission noted in 1995, the most successful programs for
increasing the representation of women and minorities in the workplace-and
particularly in the higher ranks-involve strong central commitment and clear
channels of accountability. 66 Diversity must become a core institutional value if it
is to be an institutional reality. In a recent article, Professor Sturm described the
transformation wrought at the University of Michigan through efforts by
"university change agents" working together with the National Science Foundation
(NSF) through an ADVANCE Institutional Transformation Award.67 These
efforts engaged key administrative personnel in surveying the climate at the
University, targeting areas that needed change and developing initiatives that
responded directly to perceived barriers. The barriers identified included
disproportionate service obligations without corresponding authority for women,
lack of openness regarding policies and procedures, continued operation of an "old
boy network" and a failure of University policy to take account of "differences in
household structure that placed greater demands on women." 68 Through this grant,
the University of Michigan successfully removed a number of barriers to women's
full "inclusion and advancement" in science and engineering departments at the
school. 69 The process of reaching the measurable outcomes that this program
achieved was one of program-wide exploration and conversation, which actively
involved leaders within the University community in a careful evaluation of the
impediments to advancement and the potential for removing those impediments. 70
Ultimately, if internal compliance efforts are to achieve some part of what
litigation has not yet done, they will require this kind of voluntary commitment and
cooperation. As Sturm put it in describing the Michigan program, "[w]orkplace
equality is achieved by connecting inclusiveness to core institutional values and
practices. This is a process of ongoing institutional change. It involves identifying
the barriers to full participation and the pivot points for removing those barriers
and increasing participation. '7 1 These kinds of efforts require active, conscious
movement toward a more inclusive workplace. They may not be possible in all
employment contexts; in particular these internal reforms may be effective
primarily in workplaces-like universities-which enjoy a relatively high degree
of worker voice. While it is important to recognize this and other limitations to
internal compliance as a force in efforts toward equal employment opportunity,
academic and similar workplaces may also serve as models of the possible that can
be transported to other contexts.
66. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, GOOD FOR BUSINESS: MAKING FULL USE OF THE NATION'S
HUMAN CAPITAL, A FACT-FINDING REPORT OF THE FEDERAL GLASS CEILING COMMISSION
(1995), available at http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/reich/reports/ceiling.pdf.
67. Sturm, supra note 57.
68. Id. at 283-85.
69. Id. at 252-53.
70. Id. at 287-300.
71. Id. at 249.
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CONCLUSION
Those who conceived the disparate impact theory understood decades ago that
equal employment opportunity for minorities and women could not be achieved
through litigation targeting only the individual, intentional acts of discrimination
that were the most obvious impediments to full participation. Deeper barriers
existed then, and continue to exist today. The question of how best to unsettle the
institutional structures that limit opportunities for women and minorities at work
remains a subject of debate. Litigation must play a role in this effort, as the threat
of liability remains the greatest impetus for change. Disparate impact claims will
no doubt continue to be part of the litigation picture. But given the limitations of
disparate impact as a litigation tool, internal employer efforts at institutional
transformation may hold out greater potential for the kinds of structural change
that the disparate impact theory has helped to reveal as necessary to true
employment equality. The University employment setting reveals both the limits
of litigation and the possibilities of internal compliance efforts in ways that may
prove instructive for employees and employers more generally.
